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SYMPOSIUM
MINNESOTA AND THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
Introduction
EDMUND M. MORGAN*

Many years of experience in endeavoring to convince future
and contemporary members of the profession that they should do
something tp make the rules of procedure the means of adjusting
the real disputes of litigants 'm an orderly manner as speedily and
inexpensively as possible, has generated a pessimism which this
symposium does little or nothing to dissipate. It is easy enough
to demonstrate (a) that the orthodox rules of pleading, evidence
and practice erect needless obstructions to rational investigation and
decision on the merits, (b) that the asserted justification for many
of them is largely the'accepted but inexplicable judicial misconception of the capacities of jurors, which attributes to them, on the one
'hand, a childlike credulity and naivet6 and, on the other a God-like
control of their mental and emotional processes combined with an
intellectual power to understand and apply instructions phrased
in language unintellible to most laymen and to many lawyers, and
(c) that the exclusionary rules, as a whole, are a conglomeration
of inconsistencies which prevent jurors from hearing highly relevant, credible evidence while permitting them to hear and consider
evidence of slight weight and doubtful credibility. But it is quite
another thing to stir lawyers to effective action. In their practice
the procedural questions arise one at a time. Frequently neither side
insists upon the observance of the rules. The application of a particular rule works sometimes to the advantage of one side, sometimes
to the advantage of the other. And when a body representing the
more progressive members of the profession propose a code or set
of rules, the majority in effect condemn it by ignoring it, and a
smaller group will register individual opposition to provisions contrary to those current rules which are usually applied in their favor
in litigation.
*Frank C. Rand, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Royall Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard University.
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Consequently I fear that when the Uniform Rules are submitted for adoption or when it is proposed that they be so submitted, the reaction of the profession will be a composite of the
views of our authors who are in active practice or whose academic
careers were preceded by much experience at the trial table. If so,
there will be general agreement that a codification of the rules in
simple language would be highly desirable. But the average member
of the Bar will want to leave unchanged those rules with which he
has long been familiar and will read with hostile eye any proposed
amendment. He will voice no objection to what appears to be a rational restatement or return of the rules which he has had little or
no occasion to use. For example, our plaintiff author apparently has
had little or no occasion to consider carefully the subject of judicial
notice, and so the provisions of the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules seemed satisfactory to him. Then he discovered the article by
Professor Davis' and was quickly convinced that not just one provision but the whole section would not do. So far as he discloses, he
made no attempt to discover why two groups of judges, lawyers and
legal scholars, after mature consideration, had reached conclusions
so easily demolished by an attractively written article by a professor
whose specialty is administrative law, or to question the analysis
and interpretation of the opinions upon which the author relied,
and the probable judicial interpretation of the language of the
rules which he condemned. Without taking serious objection to
Rule 41, he notes that the application of a "contrary doctrine" enabled him to get a new trial at which he secured a verdict in twice
the amount of that at the former trial. Rule 41 excludes evidence
"to show the effect of any statement, condition or event upon the
mind of a juror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined." The evidence in question consisted of statements made
by the foreman of the earlier jury to his fellow jurors in the jury
room of events which would have been inadmissible if offered in
evidence at the trial, including an assertion of the result of a trial in
another jurisdiction and of a "good and fair" offer of settlement
rejected by plaintiff. Obviously this evidence had nothing to do
with the effect of these assertions on the mind of any juror, but
showed objective misconduct in the jury room, and would have been
clearly admissible under the Rules. If our plaintiff author had not
viewed the rule with a jaundiced eye, how could he have so misinterpreted it? Both he and the defendant author would reject
1. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945 (1955).
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the rules on presumptions, but for different reasons. And both arc
opposed to the-proposal for' judge-appointed expert witnesses.
Plaintiff has no objection to the abolition of the rule in the
Queen's case, but defendant would prefer to keep it. Plaintiff is
opposed to all privileges, but if any is to be preserved, it must be
the statutorily-created physician-patient privilege. Defendant notes
objection to that-privilege alone, and Professor Louisell, who has
had much experience at the Bar, thinks that they all should be preserved since they express the judicial or legislative conviction that
the relationship involved in each is fostered by the privilege and is
one which society desries to have protected and encouraged.
And so it goes. The one near miracle is the approval of or lack
of objection to Rule 45, which is in substance a copy of Rule 303 of
the Model Code; no provision of that Code has been more savagely
attacked by the Bar than Rule 303. And no commentator has
opposed the abolition of the'so-called dead-man statute.
The topics of relevancy of evidence, competency of witnesses and
impeachment of witnesses are given comparatively little attention
by our practitioner authors although some of the rules seem to
defendant more objectionable than they seem to plaintiff. The other
subjects are treated in five separate articles by law teachers, two
of whom-bad assistance. Their approval or disapproval, whether
express or implied, unless history fails to repeat itself, will have
little 'effect in changing the opinion of the Bar. However, the objective of the symposium is not propaganda but education. Its purpose is the exposition of the content of the rules as compared with
those now in force in Minnesota, and these five articles amply
fulfill that purpose. The extent to which reasons are given supporting the existing rules as contrasted with those supporting the
proposed rules varies, but each author furnishes sufficient material
to enable the reader to come to a fair conclusion as to the advisability
of adopting the several rules in substance whether or not the phrasing is satisfactory. The article on Rules 13-17 not only makes the
requisite comparison between their provisions and the existing
Minnesota law but constitutes a much needed clarifying treatment
of the entire subject of presumptions-a subject which heretofore
produced a plethora of conflicting judicial opinions and of confused and confusing discussions by judges, lawyers and law-teachers,
many, if not most, of which merely increased the density of the
surrounding fog. The article dealing with Opinion is both informative and persuasive that for the greater part the rules will not
reverse the trend of modern judicial decisions. As to the appoint-
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ment of expert witnesses by the judge, it shows how the adversaries are amply protected against abuse and prejudice. But the
objection that a judge may play favorites and that his favorites may
not be of really superior skill and learning and may not be really
impartial may still have some force. The Uniform Commissioners
did not have the benefit of knowing the result of the experiment in
New York and Bronx Counties conducted with the approval and
aid of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in securing
impartial medical testimony. The report of that experiment should
be thoroughly considered whenever a proposal for court-appointed
experts is submitted for adoption. See Impartial Medical Testimony; A Report by a Special Committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York on the Medical Expert Testimony
Project.

